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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000959

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

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TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU

SUBJECT: DARFUR: MUTRIFF REITERATES SUDAN'S SUPPORT FOR HYBRID

Classified By: P/E Chief T. Monroe, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary  
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¶11. (C) Sudan reiterated its acceptance of the UN/AU hybrid force during a June 18 briefing in Khartoum. Siddiq Mutriff, the Government's lead negotiator during the recent consultations in Addis Ababa, said that this acceptance included UN command and control, non-African personnel, and a full transfer of AMIS' current functions to the hybrid mission. Though a senior official also alluded to Sudanese acceptance of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the hybrid similar to UNMIS' current SOFA, another official later admitted to "sensitivities." Emphasizing the delays in the Light and Heavy Support Packages, Sudan called for the immediate passage of UN and AU resolutions authorizing the force and underscored the urgency of hybrid deployment. End summary.

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Clarification on Hybrid  
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¶12. (C) During a June 18 briefing for Western ambassadors in Khartoum, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Siddiq Mutriff, the Sudanese Government's lead negotiator during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa, reiterated Sudan's acceptance of the United Nations/African Union hybrid peace-keeping force. Mutriff explained that the agreement reached between his government, the UN, and the AU during the consultations in Addis Ababa represented a clarification of the "terms of reference" for the UN/AU hybrid force agreed to in Addis Ababa and Abuja in November ¶2006. Command and control will consist of the "structures and processes from the UN to the mission in Darfur." Mutriff characterized the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as "nearly identical." While denying that the Government had had internal discussions on the SOFA for the UN/AU hybrid, he alluded to Sudanese acceptance of the UNMIS SOFA but said that it could be "revised" if the UN and AU requested changes.

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Non-African Troops? Yes  
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¶13. (C) Responding to a question from the German Ambassador if "Sudan would accept troops from other continents," Mutriff responded: "Yes, the answer is flatly yes. The mission itself

was not entirely African from the beginning and has needed the support of other countries." He explained that Africa could not contribute to all the "structures of the mission" and said that assistance from non-African countries would be critical in the areas of administration, logistical support, and finance. The Swedish Charge d'Affaires asked if Sudan would permit non-African "enabling forces," to which Mutriff responded: "Yes, the same (as his previous answer). We had it already in the Light Support Package and the Heavy Support Package."

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AMIS as the "Seed"  
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¶4. (C) Mutriff characterized the existing AMIS force as "the seed" for the UN/AU hybrid force. With deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP) the AMIS force would consist of 10,000 to 11,000 troops; personnel for the hybrid would supplement this existing force to raise the number to 17,000 or more. Civilian functions dealing with HIV/AIDS, gender, human rights, and rule of law existed under AMIS and would be "shifted" to the UN/AU hybrid. Other "assignments of AMIS," such as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration; the Cease-fire Commission; and police patrolling would be transferred to the hybrid as well. "In short, the hybrid entails all assignments entrusted to AMIS in the DPA, with some additions," Mutriff said. He suggested that these additions would include support for the political process led by UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim and subsequent agreements reached during this process.

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Delays in LSP, HSP  
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¶5. (C) Pointing to the delays in the Light and Heavy Supports Packages, Mutriff said that only 155 of the 185 "elements" of the Light Support Package (LSP) had "materialized." Mutriff called for the expeditious deployment of the hybrid operation and claimed that the Sudanese Government was prepared to facilitate this deployment through an inter-ministerial committee that he would chair. Based on requests from the UN, Mutriff said preparations were underway to transfer land for the construction of facilities. If the Sudanese Government owned the land, it would be transferred immediately. If the land was privately-owned, the UN/AU would need to provide "appropriate compensation." The Government had also reached agreement with the UN on water surveys for El Fasher and Nyala on the condition that the survey include the surrounding neighborhoods.

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New Resolutions Urgent  
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¶6. (C) Mutriff said that in order to move forward with the land and water issues the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council should take immediate action to pass resolutions on the hybrid operation, as agreed to in the June 12 conclusions from Addis Ababa. Sudan had also approved assistance from Nigeria, China, Egypt, and Pakistan to provide elements of the HSP and was prepared to approve similar contributions from Jordan and Russia after the UN had forwarded their offers. The UN had indicated, however, that the deployment of the HSP would not begin until after the end of the rainy season in the fall.

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"Some Sensitivities" on the SOFA  
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¶7. (C) In a private conversation with Poloff after the briefing, the Acting Director of the Peace Department at the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IO equivalent) admitted that there were "some sensitivities" about specific elements of the current UNMIS SOFA and that the SOFA for the hybrid would not need to differ from the SOFA under which AMIS operates. When pressed for the nature of the sensitivities, the Acting Director initially suggested that Poloff "check with the UN."

He later back-tracked and said that any issues on the SOFA could be resolved at the "technical level," a method that had proven effective during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa. The Swedish Charge d'Affaires then joined the conversation and asked how AMIS would weather the period before deployment of the HSP and the hybrid given its current rules of engagement. The Acting Director blamed the Darfur rebel movements, including the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi, for the attacks on AMIS forces and said that rapid deployment of the HSP and the hybrid would obviate such difficulties.

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Comment  
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¶8. (C) Sudan is justifying its change of course on the UN/AU hybrid as a natural evolution of its agreement to the Addis Ababa conclusions of November 2006, on which it needed "clarification" in order to accept. In response to specific questions on the deployment of the Heavy Support Package and the UN/AU hybrid--such as the SOFA, land acquisition, and flight and customs clearances--the international community can now expect Sudan to begin repeating the same refrain: the need for the quick passage of UN and AU resolutions on the hybrid and rapid deployment of the force. End comment.

FERNANDEZ